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  1I.  Introduction 
The Social Security system contains many features designed to provide an adequate 
retirement income for families, rather than just individual retired workers.  The most 
important of these features is the spousal benefit, under which secondary earners are 
entitled to receive a monthly payment of 50 percent of their spouse’s monthly Social 
Security benefit.  Secondary earners may also elect to receive benefits based on their own 
earnings records if they are higher than the spousal benefit; historically, however, the 
spousal benefit provided a large source of benefits for non-working spouses in one-earner 
couples.  Of course, the existence of a spousal benefit raises the questions about what 
happens in the event of divorce.  Currently, an individual may not claim a spousal benefit 
based on an ex-spouse’s earnings record if the marriage lasted less than 10 years.  If the 
marriage lasted 10 years or more, however, the divorced spouse is entitled to the full 
spousal benefit in retirement.   
The spousal benefit and the general rules for divorce were designed during the early 
years of the program, during which family structure differed considerably from today.  At 
the inception of the system, such a design made sense.  As discussed by Smith (2002), in 
1940, almost three quarters of families had a working husband and non-working wife; 
less than 10 percent were two-earner couples.  In contrast, in 1998, only 15 percent were 
one-earner couples, and close to 50 percent were two-earner couples.  Moreover, 
women’s labor force participation has increased from around 34 percent in 1950 to 
almost 60 percent in 2005.
1  As a result, more married women receive benefits based on 
their own records, making the spousal benefit (and divorce rules) irrelevant for a larger 
fraction of the population.  The Social Security Administration reports that in 1970, 16 
                                                 
1 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2007, Table 575 
  2percent of benefit recipients were receiving spousal benefits; by 2005, this number had 
fallen to around 7 percent.  This shift in family structure has led to a criticism of the 
spousal benefit on equity grounds, as one-earner couples receive a higher rate of return 
from Social Security compared to two-earner couples.  The existence of the spousal 
benefit also has efficiency considerations from a labor supply point-of-view:  secondary 
earners face large distortions in their labor supply decisions because their Social Security 
contributions only increase their benefits to the extent that they are larger than the spousal 
benefit (Feldstein and Samwick (1992), Goda (2007)).   
Divorce rates have also increased considerably over the last half a century.  The  
divorce rate has risen from about 2.6 divorces per year per 1,000 people in 1950, to 3.7 
divorces per year per 1,000 people in 2004.
2  In 1950, only about 2 percent of men and 
women reported their marital status as divorced; by 2005, this number had risen to 11 
percent for women and 9 percent for men.  The increase in the divorce rate makes the 
divorce rules more relevant for individuals who plan to claim the spousal benefit.
3
Social Security’s rules for divorce have also been criticized on equity grounds.  A 
marriage lasting only 9 years leaves a non-working spouse with no benefit entitlement; 
on the other hand, staying together for 10 years results in a large increase in potential 
benefits.  Thus, a shorter marriage may leave a divorced spouse with inadequate income 
in retirement.  As reported by Smith (2002), in 1990, the median marriage length among 
divorced couples was only 7.2 years, with 63 percent divorcing within 10 years.  
Therefore, the 10-year requirement potentially affects a large number of individuals.  
Favreault et al. (2006) provide a detailed analysis of the equity implications of the current 
                                                 
2 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2007, Table 76. 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status of the Population 15 Years Old and Over, by Sex and Race: 1950 to 
Present, Table MS-1. 
  3system; they also evaluate a variety of reforms including income splitting, under which a 
couple’s total earnings credits are split equally at the time of divorce. 
In this paper, we focus on the efficiency implications of Social Security’s divorce 
rules.  One might expect these rules to affect the timing of divorce.  For a couple married 
9 years, there is a strong incentive to wait until the 10
th year to divorce.  Moreover, a 
divorced person may be reluctant to remarry if it means giving up the spousal benefit 
from the first marriage.  Of course, these incentives only apply to couples in which the 
secondary earner intends to claim spousal benefits, rather than benefits based on her own 
earnings record.  Dickert-Conlin and Meghea’s (2004) results – which are based on 
divorce rates aggregated by age of the wife – suggest that Social Security’s rules do not 
appear to affect the timing of divorce and remarriage.   
We revisit this question using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
Marital History File.  This dataset allows us to do an individual-level analysis, in which 
we control for characteristics, including the likelihood of claiming the spouse benefit.  To 
do this, we identify “vulnerable” individuals, who are likely to claim spousal benefits 
instead of benefits based on their own records.  Vulnerable individuals are likely to be 
affected by Social Security’s divorce rules.  Couples with a vulnerable spouse have an 
incentive to delay divorce from year 9 to year 10 in order to preserve the vulnerable 
spouse’s Social Security benefit.  There are no similar incentives for delay in the timing 
of divorce among couples in which both individuals intend to claim their own Social 
Security benefit. 
Our household-level analysis corroborates the findings of Dickert-Conlin and 
Meghea.  We find that vulnerable couples are slightly more likely than non-vulnerable 
  4ones to delay divorce from year 9 to year 10.  However, the difference is small and 
statistically insignificant.  We attribute this finding to several possible factors.  For 
example, the Social Security benefit computation is complex, and many individuals may 
not be aware of the divorce rules.  In addition, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that 
individuals are myopic in planning for their retirements.  Thus, it should not be surprising 
if young couples do not consider the implications of delaying divorce for their future 
Social Security benefits. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an overview of Social 
Security’s rules regarding marriage and divorce, and a review of the previous literature.  
Section III presents our methodology and results.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II.  Background and Previous Literature 
Social Security provides a spousal benefit equal to 50 percent of the primary earner’s 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) to spouses of workers who have been married for at 
least one year.  The PIA is determined by applying a concave function to the Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) which is the monthly average of the highest 35 years 
of the worker’s wage-indexed earnings during their lifetime.  The concavity in the 
formula provides low lifetime income earners with a higher replacement rate than high 
lifetime income earners.  The secondary earner’s benefit is the maximum of the spousal 
benefit and the benefits determined by his or her own earnings record.   Because of the 
progressivity of the formula that converts the AIME to a PIA, it is not the case that 
workers need to earn, on average, 50 percent of what the primary worker earns every year 
in order to generate a benefit larger than the spousal benefit.  The exact fraction depends 
  5on the relative earnings amounts within the couple, but in many instances is closer to one-
third.  Figure 1 shows the necessary fraction of the primary worker’s earnings for 
different values of the primary worker’s average indexed monthly earnings. 
Figure 1 
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According to the Social Security Administration, there were almost 31 million 
workers receiving benefits based on their own earnings record in 2006.  In addition to 
this, around 2.5 million individuals received spousal benefits.  Of those receiving spousal 
benefits, more than 98 percent were female.  However, women are increasingly likely to 
receive benefits based on their own earnings record.  In 1970, around 2.7 million women 
received spousal benefits.  By 2006, that had fallen to 2.4 million despite an increase in 
the elderly female population.
4
When a couple divorces, the secondary earner is entitled to collect the full Social 
Security spousal benefit if the marriage lasted 10 or more years.  However, if the 
                                                 
4 Social Security Administration, Social Security Beneficiary Statistics, December 20, 2006. 
  6secondary earner remarries, the spousal benefit from the first marriage is no longer 
available.  (It is, therefore, possible for several individuals to receive spousal benefits for 
the same primary worker.)  The 10-year requirement is relatively recent.  Prior to 1977, a 
marriage was required to last for 20 years before an ex-spouse could claim the spousal 
benefit.  Increasing divorce rates in the 1960s and 1970s prompted the change in the law, 
as policy makers were concerned that women who were divorced after less than 20 years 
of marriage would be left in poverty. 
Dickert-Conlin and Meghea (2006) carry out a differences-in-differences analysis that 
focuses on the 1977 law change.  They compare the divorce rates of 7-year marriages (the 
control group) with those of 9- and 10-year marriages (the treatment groups) both before 
and after 1977.  One would expect the divorce rate in the 9-year marriage group to fall 
relative to the control group after 1977, as postponing divorce by a year would result in 
an entitlement to a spousal benefit.  (In contrast, the 7-year marriage group would have to 
postpone divorce by three years, which has a significantly higher cost.)  Additionally, the 
10-year marriage group should have displayed an increase in divorces relative to the 
control group after 1977.  The authors find some evidence of a decline in the divorce rate 
for 9-year marriages; however, there appears to have been no impact on 10-year 
marriages.  Hence there is not much support for the claim that the change in Social 
Security’s divorce rules affected the timing of divorce.  A similar analysis suggests that 
remarriage behavior was not affected either.  In this case, the treatment group is women 
whose marriages lasted for 10 years.  This group of women became eligible for spousal 
benefits in 1977, provided they did not remarry.  The control group is women whose 
marriages lasted for 9 years, and were therefore not eligible for spousal benefits.  One 
  7would expect the latter group to have a higher remarriage rate than the former after the 
1977 law change; however, the data did not support this claim. 
Of course, the predicted effect on behavior only apply to couples in which the 
secondary earner intends to claim spousal benefits, rather than benefits based on her own 
earnings record.  The Dickert-Conlin and Meghea (2006) analysis makes no distinction 
between these two groups.  This provides a possible alternative explanation for their 
findings.  If many women are claiming benefits on their own record, then one might not 
find an effect for women overall, as only a subset of women alter their behavior. 
While the existing literature provides little evidence of distorted behavior, the divorce 
rules certainly raise significant equity concerns.  The current method of 10-year “cliff”-
vesting means that secondary workers with marriages that lasted 9 years and 11 months 
will not receive any spousal benefits from Social Security from that marriage, while those 
in marriages lasting 10 years would receive spousal benefits based on their ex-spouse’s 
entire earnings history at retirement.  Favreault and Steuerle (2006) point out that, while 
the overall poverty rate among the elderly is low, poverty is significant problem among 
elderly women.  The policy also creates large disparities in taxes paid relative to benefits 
received.  For example, a man who marries multiple times for 10 years or longer can 
obtain (for his exes) several spousal benefits from one earnings history. 
As discussed by Thompson and Carasso (2002), many other countries use earnings 
sharing to address such equity concerns.  In Belgium and France, for example, divorced 
spouses receive a benefit that is tied to the length of the marriage.  Many other 
industrialized countries split the couple’s total earnings credits at the time of divorce, 
treating the divorced couple as two singles in computing benefits.  The earnings-splitting 
  8is either specified by law (e.g. in Canada, Germany, and Switzerland), or determined by 
the divorce court (e.g., in Spain and the United Kingdom). 
Favreault and Steuerle (2006) investigate the implications of several reforms that aim 
to improve the equity, efficiency, and adequacy of Social Security’s treatment of the 
family.  They examine three versions of earnings-splitting proposals, and incremental 
changes such as providing a minimum level of benefits and providing caregiver credits.  
The simulated winners and losers under each proposal differ, but divorced women fare 
better under earnings-splitting reforms.   
Brien et al. (2001) study another aspect of the Social Security system: the treatment 
of widows.  When a widow reaches normal retirement age, she may claim a widow 
benefit equal to 100 percent of her deceased husband’s PIA.  Prior to 1979, a widow who 
remarried lost her claim on the widow benefit, although she could claim a spousal benefit 
based on the earnings of her new husband.  The spousal benefit is, of course, less 
generous than the widow benefit, as it amounts to only 50 percent of the primary earner’s 
PIA.  In 1979, the law was changed to allow widows aged 60 and above to claim the 
widow benefit even if they remarried.  However, widows under age 60 were still subject 
to the old rules.   The authors show that widows aged 60 and above had an increased 
marriage rate in 1979, indicating that many individuals in this group had waited to 
remarry until the law went into effect (it was passed in 1977).  Moreover, they found that 
after 1979, marriage rates declined among widows just under age 60, and increased 
among widows over 60.  This indicates that after 1979, widows just under age 60 started 
waiting until age 60 to remarry in order to retain their widow benefit.   
  9Our analysis also fits into the broader literature on how fiscal policy affects 
individuals’ choice of family structure.  A number of studies have shown that marriage 
penalties created by the income tax and welfare programs have an impact on the timing 
of marriage and divorce.  Alm et al. (1999) provide a review of this literature. 
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
Our data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1985-2003 Marital 
History File.  This dataset contains a marital history for each PSID respondent.  Since 
respondents are asked to provide information about previous marriages, the histories also 
include marriages that began and ended prior to 1985.  For our analysis, each observation 
consists of one marriage for an individual in the survey.  If an individual has multiple 
marriages, it is possible for that person to appear in multiple observations.  However, 
because of the data collection procedures, not all marriages for all individuals appear in 
the data.  We generally treat each marriage as a separate observation.  Clearly, multiple 
marriages for the same individual might not be independent observations.  To see if this 
affects the results, we also do all of our estimates using only the first marriage that 
appears in the sample for all individuals.  Our qualitative results do not change.
5  After 
dropping observations with missing values, we end up with a sample of 16,361 
marriages.  We merge this marital history data with the income data routinely collected 
by the PSID.   
According to our discussion in the previous section, an individual whose AIME is 
less than a third of his or her spouse’s is better off claiming the spouse benefit.  We 
define an individual as defined “vulnerable” if his or her average is less than a third of the 
                                                 
5 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
  10primary worker’s income.  Vulnerable individuals are most likely to rely on the spousal 
benefit, rather than benefits based on their own records.  Couples with a vulnerable 
spouse are most likely to alter their behavior in response to Social Security’s divorce 
rules.  Of course, the calculation of the spousal benefit is based on the individuals’ 
AIMEs, which take into account their wages over their entire working life.  During the 
earlier years of a marriage, individuals cannot know with certainty their ultimate AIME.  
At this point, a couple’s expected AIMEs will influence the divorce decision.  Of course, 
estimating an individual’s expected average income is tricky.  For our base case, we 
average income in all years prior to and during the marriage for which data are available.  
This computation contains two implicit assumptions.  First, the couple perfectly 
anticipates their future income path during the marriage.  Second, for marriages that end 
in divorce, the individuals’ average incomes up until the divorce decision are a good 
estimate of what their average incomes would have been had the marriage continued.  
Note that we do not include years after the marriage ended.  An individual may intend to 
claim the spousal benefit while married, yet seek out a higher paying job if the marriage 
ends.  Such an individual should correctly be classified as vulnerable, as it is their 
anticipated status during the marriage that is relevant for the divorce decision.   
By this definition, there are 6,883 marriages in which one spouse is vulnerable.  In 
91.1 percent of these marriages, the vulnerable spouse is the wife.  Clearly our definition 
of vulnerable individuals does not perfectly capture those who intend to receive spousal 
benefits.  However, there should be a correlation between vulnerability as defined here 
and the dependence on spousal benefits. 
  11Vulnerable marriages are our treatment group for the analysis.  The control group 
consists of all the other marriages.  We predict that the treatment group should be more 
responsive to Social Security’s divorce rules than the control group.  Consider the set of 
all couples entering their 9
th year of marriage who are contemplating divorce.  Those in 
the treatment group have larger costs associated with divorce before 10 years.  Therefore, 
we would expect a decline in the divorce rate of the treatment group, relative to the 
control group, at 9 years of marriage.  We would also expect an increase in the relative 
divorce rate of the treatment group at 10 years of marriage. 
Figure 2 depicts the conditional and unconditional probabilities of divorce by length 
of marriage for the entire sample.  The probability of divorce is simply the fraction of 
marriages ending after t years.  The conditional probability of divorce is the fraction of 
couples divorcing after t years of marriage, conditional on being married at time t-1.   
(The graph does not include the 316 marriages that either failed or left the sample before 
the first year.)  Only about 1 percent of marriages fail after one year.  The divorce rate 
increases until the 4
th year of marriage, then levels off and falls.  
Figure 2 
Conditional and Unconditional Probability of Divorce for All Individuals 
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Figure 3 shows the conditional divorce probability for the vulnerable group and the 
entire sample.  There appears to be a small dip in the probability of divorce in year 9, 
followed by an increase in year 10.  However, this appears for both the control and the 
treatment groups.  Moreover, for both groups, the effect appears to be small. 
Figure 3  













  13We perform a formal regression analysis to determine whether there is any 
statistically significant impact of Social Security’s divorce rules.  We begin with the set 
of all marriages lasting 8 or more years.  There are three possible outcomes for these 8-
year marriages: 
1.  Divorce in year 9, 
2.  Divorce in year 10, or 
3.  No divorce in either year 9 or year 10. 
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sample size to 8,076, as we are forced to drop observations with missing values.   
                                                
 6 whether each spouse was over the age of 22 at the 
beginning of the marriage, and whether each spouse had finished high school and colleg
prior to the end of the marriage.  The PSID’s racial classifications have expanded gre
over time.  In the initial years of the survey, the only categories coded were white, 
African-American, and other race.  Therefore, we consolidate the racial categories in
subsequent waves of the survey and include only indicators for African-American and
other race.  The entire sample of 8-year marriages consists of 8,474 observations, o
which 3,877 have a vulnerable spouse.  Including the independent variables reduces
 
6 Race is only available for the household head. 
  14Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the independent variables 
broken down by vulnerability status. The control groups have similar marriage lengths.  
Bot 71 
Full Sample  Vulnerable  Not Vulnerable 
h husbands and wives in the treatment group tend to get married at a younger age: 
percent of men in the treatment group were over the age of 22 at marriage, compared to 
78 percent in the control group.  For the wives, 55 percent of the treatment group was 
over 22 at the time of marriage, compared to 64 percent of the control group.  Wives in 
the control group are more likely to have finished college (but not high school).  
Husbands in the control group are more likely to have finished high school (but not 
college).  Finally, the control group contains a greater percentage of African American 
household heads. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
Le
Marriage 
18.81 7.33 17.80 6.97  ngth of  18.26 7.15 
Husband 
Over 22 at 
0.75 0.43 0. 6 
Marriage 

















0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.44 
Wife 
Finished 
0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 
High 
School 
  15Head 
African 
merica A n 
0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.33 0.47 
Head Other  0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 
Race 
 
Relative risk  for o e 2 (divorce in ye  relati utcom divorce 
in year 9) are presented in Table 2.






re income path if the marriage continues.  As a robustness check, we 
red ure 
 
                                                
 ratios utcom ar 10) ve to o e 1 (
inition that incorporates income throughout the length of the marriage.  The 
coefficient of interest is the relative risk ratio for the treatment dummy, which indicate
the treatment group’s risk of getting divorced in year 10 relative to 9 ( 1 2 / i i p p ), 
by the same ratio for the control group.  Our prediction is that this value should be greate
than 1 – that is, relative to the control group, the treatment group’s pro  of divorce
falls in year 9 and increases in year 10.  The point estimate of the relative risk ratio is 
1.12, suggesting that the treatment group is slightly more likely than the control group to 
delay divorce from year 9 to year 10.  However, this coefficient is statistically 
insignificant.  In general, the other independent variables don’t appear to be statistically 
significant either. 
As discussed above, our definition of vulnerability assumes that couples perfectly 
anticipate their futu
o our regression analysis under the alternative that couples do not anticipate any fut
changes in their income.  That is, we classify people as vulnerable if their average income
until the 8
th year of marriage is less than a third of their spouse’s.  The implicit 
assumption here is that individuals expect their future average income to be similar to 
 
7 Relative risk ratios for the never divorced outcome relative to outcome 1 are omitted, but are available 
from the authors upon request.   
  16their average income in the 8
th year of marriage.  The sample size for this case is
7,517, as we must drop marriages in which both spouse’s average earnings are zero, 
which are more likely to occur when we only compute average earnings until the 8
 only 
ar 
 2.  




of marriage.  Regression results for this case are given in the second column of Table
They are qualitatively similar to the base case.  The treatment group’s relative probability 
of divorce does fall in year 9 and rise in year 10.  However, this difference is statistically 
insignificant. 
The only independent variable that is statistically significant in both regressions is the 
dummy variab
n 1, indicating that a woman who is younger when she marries is relatively more 
likely to delay divorce until year 10.  This is roughly consistent with the hypothesis that 
vulnerable couples delay divorce: a woman who married at a young age is more likel
be vulnerable (in a way that is not captured by our vulnerability measure) and therefore 
more likely to anticipate receiving the spouse benefit.  However, given the insignificance 
of our direct measure of vulnerability, we hesitate to interpret this isolated finding as 
evidence that Social Security’s divorce rules affect behavior. 
Table 2: Regression Results 
  17  Dependent 
variable 
Base Case  Average Income 
Through Year 8 Only   
  Treatment Group  1.12 
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(0.15) 
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0.85  0.88   


















  * Significantly different from 1 at the 5 percent level.  (Standard errors in 
parentheses.) 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Social Security’s current rules regarding divorce allow secondary workers in 
marriages that lasted at least ten years to receive spousal benefits based on the primary 
worker’s earnings history.  However, secondary workers whose marriages lasted less than 
ten years do not receive this benefit.  As a large number of marriages that fail do so 
before ten years, the rules create equity concerns.  This “cliff”-vesting means that 
secondary workers in marriages that fail before ten years undergo a significant loss in 
terms of future retirement benefits, especially if their earnings were significantly lower 
than their spouses.  In our sample of marriages that lasted at least eight years and using a 
definition of vulnerable that requires the secondary earner’s average earnings to be at 
  18least one third of his or her spouse’s average earnings, 46 percent of couples have a 
vulnerable spouse.  This represents a significant percentage of all marriages.   
We attempt to detect a behavioral response by spouses that are more vulnerable to a 
divorce before the tenth year of marriage relative to a control group.  The control group 
consists of couples where the secondary earner would likely earn more than the spousal 
benefit.  Because the secondary worker receives the maximum of the benefit calculated 
from his or her own earnings record and the spousal benefit, the spousal benefit is 
thought to be of little value to the secondary workers in the control group.  While the 
presence of the spousal benefit still provides secondary workers in this category some 
insurance, it is relatively far less important to secondary workers in the control group 
relative to the vulnerable couples. 
Our regression results show little evidence for a behavioral response among 
vulnerable couples relative to the control group.  While the relative risk ratios in the 
multinomial regression indicate that vulnerable couples are slightly more likely to delay 
divorce in their ninth year of marriage to the tenth year, the effect is not statistically 
significant and is small in magnitude.  Therefore, we conclude that the divorce rules in 
Social Security do not have strong efficiency implications with regards to divorce 
incentives even for couples where the secondary spouse is more vulnerable to the 
potential loss in retirement benefits.  There are several possible explanations for why 
individuals may not respond to the incentives to delay divorce until the tenth year of 
marriage:  individuals may not be fully aware of the divorce rules in Social Security; they 
may be myopic regarding the extra retirement benefits they are losing from earlier 
divorce; they may value the earlier dissolution of their marriage more highly than the 
  19added retirement benefits far into the future; they may have better information about their 
future earnings potential than is available in our data; or they may expect to remarry and 
receive spousal benefits from their future spouse’s earnings record.  Further research 
could shed some light on which of these explanations accounts for the insignificant 
behavioral response to divorce rules in Social Security. 
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